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The Fight for
Free Will

By Antoinette Steely
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The history of science has
taught us that most concepts are
dynamic. Society creates temporary
taxonomies of words through
casual language and functional
context, then it is the role of
science to discover the meaning
behind these terms and assign
them a true definition. Water was
just an ambiguous phrase used to
reference something unknown until
scientific discoveries illuminated
the complexities at work and
provided the word with value. This
idea that scientific explanations
provide meaning by identifying
the objective physical properties
behind a phenomenon has been
reliable, but some ideas are more
abstract and cannot be fully
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described in purely physical terms.
Free will is one of these nearly
inconceivable concepts, yet it is
fundamental to our understanding
of both individual and social human
life. In the past few decades,
neuroscience has begun to address
questions of freedom and moral
responsibility that had previously
been left to philosophy. When the
natural sciences first addressed
the topic, many rejected the past
history of philosophical work, and
came to accept that the physics
and neuroscience had undermined
the previous definition of agency.
An agent is no longer capable of
causing change through decided
action. In a physically determined
world, free will must merely be

a perceptual illusion that we
experience as a byproduct of
unconscious brain activity. The
natural sciences have jumped to
the conclusion that the argument
to best explanation must be that
free will as we know it does not
exist; however, this is based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of
what constitutes freedom.
The conviction against
free will began in 1983 when
Benjamin Libet conducted a series
of
extraordinary
experiments
that showed evidence that the
intent for deciding is made
unconsciously1. The physiologist
at the University of California,
San Francisco was enthusiastically
praised for the mighty impact he
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made against human free will,
but the philosophical adoption
of his ideas was a mistake. In his
original experiment, participants
were instructed to perform small
finger movements, and report
the moment when they became
aware of the conscious decision to
move2. This measurement showed
physical evidence of brain activity
before conscious awareness of
self-initiated movement through
a rise in an electrical potential or
“readiness potential (RP).”

Immanuel Kant revolutionized the
relationship between the internal
and the external by suggesting that
decisions are formed within the soul
and are therefore outside of time4.
Our perception of space and time
through the senses merely cause the
appearance of determined action.
If an individual’s sense of agency
is grounded in the belief that the
experience of decision making
is sufficient for free action, then
it is necessary for us to value our
experience. This necessity persists

Figure 1: A rise in the RP can clearly be shown 550 ms before a subject
experienced the conscious intention to perform a finger movement.
Libet Experiments. from Information Philosopher on Creative Commons

Under this system, decision
making is neither free nor voluntary,
and we do not have control in the
way that we think that we do. The
feeling that we have the ability to
do otherwise at any given moment
might just be an illusion. Recent
studies, however, suggest that the
Libet data had been misunderstood,
and readiness potentials represent
a build up of activity to a certain
threshold that, once passed,
trigger a voluntary act3. The
neuroscientific understanding of
free will and agency is limited to
willed action; therefore, it can
only answer questions about
executive control and the spatial
and temporal components of
decision making. The assumption
that freedom is time independent
of the will could be a mistake.
In A Critique of Pure Reason,

even if it conflicts with the way
that the world physically operates,
implying that a metaphysics of
causation is fundamental to a
complete definition of free will.
It turns out that the
philosophical debate on free will
is strengthened by neuroscientific
evidence of executive control
rather than weakened by it.
Regardless of whether or not our
decisions are based on conscious
intentions, the idea that we can
decide at all already presupposes
the existence of free will. In making
claims about freedom without first
defining the relevant terms, many
experiments have inadvertently
not only implied, but necessitated,
the types of freedom that some
philosophers do not even grant
us at all. The conclusions made in
empirical papers are generally too

hasty and often can be weakened
by counterexamples.
A preliminary definition of
free will depended on an agent
having a garden of forking paths
available to them at any moment.
This concept has long been lost
due to new developments in both
physics and in neuroscience, but it
is not the only way that philosophy
discusses personal agency and
moral responsibility. In fact, many
metaphysicians believe that our
understanding of freedom and
power differ from truly having
alternate paths. While the physical
sciences provide evidence that
agents have no freedom at all, these
empirical data are not sufficient
for a necessary understanding of
being. Robert Kane’s theory of
probabilistic causation suggests
that there is a conscious effort
involved in decision making that
keeps our outcomes from being
truly inevitable5. This effort of free
will allows for causal outcomes
which are endorsed by the agent,
and an individual can fail or succeed
in carrying out a chosen desire.
As discussed before, Libet
conducted an experiment which
made philosophers and scientists
alike rethink what types of decisions are open to choice1. Libet
evaluated spontaneous decision
making by asking participants to
perform self-initiated motor tasks
whenever they felt an urge or
desire to do so. The time of the
participants awareness of intention
was reported as W. Active scalp
electrodes were placed over the
motor and premotor cortical areas,
which are known to be responsible
for controlling hand movements.
Scalp
electroencephalography
(EEG) is a noninvasive technique for
recording RPs at the surface of the
brain. RP’s are negative spikes in
electrical activity recorded through
EEG to reflect event related
potentials. Libet found that even
when participants did not report
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preplanning for each movement,
the onset of the negative rise of
the RP could be recorded around
400-700 ms before the motor act
began2. This finding was the first to
suggest that the cerebral processes
that moderate motor action are
unconscious and involuntary. The
subjective experience of intention
then, is an epiphenomenon that
occurs after a decision is brought
forward
involuntarily
by
an
unknown cause. Consistently and
significantly, conscious intention
to act occurs 350-400 ms after the
onset of cerebral activity, meaning
that the spontaneous voluntary
acts are cerebrally initiated
unconsciously.
The Libet experiments
caused major doubt that we
understand how the way we
experience the world relates to the
way that it physically exists. While
it is important that these studies
triggered an intense debate and a
series of ongoing research to answer
this question, the implications
have been brought forward far
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too soon. EEG recordings have
high temporal resolution, meaning
that the accuracy of the time that
an RP occurs is reliable; however,
EEG recordings have low spatial
resolution. Placing an electrode
over the prefrontal motor area,
does not ensure that the recorded
RP is coming from that region.
As a highly complex system, the
brain is involved in many neuronal
processes related and unrelated
to decision making at any given
moment, many of which could
confound a signal to an electrode.
Furthermore, the Libet experiment
has been challenged many times
suggesting that this type of
experiment contains flaws, and that
we should not be so quick to give
up our fundamental understanding
of human nature.
A particularly interesting
experiment
conducted
in
2014 suggested that the Libet
experiment was misguided in
assuming that they were testing
free will and agency, rather than
an individual’s ability to reflect

upon inner events6. Jo Wittmann
and his team challenged Libet’s
study by creating an experiment
that focused on the introspective
perspective when completing
a motor task, and connected
first person experience to the
empirical brain dynamics involved
in high level conscious decision
making. They found that an expert
meditator, who is more focused and
better in touch with their mental
states, could more accurately and
reliably report neural correlates
of intentional behavior with the
subjective experience of deciding
to move. When the participant
accurately associated the feeling of
an inner impulse to move with the
RP, a recognizable pattern of similar
negative deflections was also
recorded, even if the participant
did not immediately engage in the
motor task. When there were more
frequent occurrences of conscious
willed movement during negative
deflections
of
slow
cortical
potentials, the recorded RP was
larger. This means that the negative

SCIENTIFIC KENYON

shifts of slow cortical potentials
may promote the formation of a
conscious decision to perform a
motor task by facilitating a desire
to engage in a movement before
the conscious decision. There is an
inner event, then, correlated with
brain activity that both precedes
and seemingly causes voluntary
action.
While
this
first-person
approach only had one participant,
it brought forward an important
objection
that
Libet
type
experiments do not directly record
our ability to decide. Furthermore,
it is in agreement with Libet type
follow up studies that report that
a narrowed definition of intention
has resulted in a generalized
sense of agency and conscious
will in experiments. The sensation
of wanting to move right before
doing so has been accepted as
the sufficient operational que for
intent; however, in 2013 Vinding,
Pedersen, and Overgaard found
that there are actually two types
of recordable intention involved in
the efficacy of conscious decision
making7. This intentional binding
paradigm separated immediate
proximal intention from distal or
longer standing intentions. Distal
intention represented the condition
under which a formed self-paced
intention precedes movement,
while proximal intention was the
condition under which participants
acted as soon as they experienced
the urge to do so. They found that
distal intentions, which had not
previously been recorded, resulted
in a stronger sense of agency
for participants than proximal
intention, which had been the focus
of other EEG experiments8.
In a 2014 follow-up study, the
group found a slow negative EEG
response that could be recorded at
the time when participants formed
a self-initiated distal intention.
This electrophysiological potential
was not reported when patients

intentions were formed as a
response to a cue rather than selfpaced, suggesting that experiments
that require cued motor tasks may
not be testing an individual’s own
agency. The temporal aspect of
intention allowed the experimenters
to focus on decision making
and conscious intention without
other confounding motor activity.
If distinct electrophysiological
activity that is unrelated to action
generation can be elicited by
slow negative electrophysiological
potential found above mid frontal
areas, then conscious intention
is related to motor activity, and
we do not form decisions fully
unconsciously7.
will seems to be
Free
essential for individual and social well-being; however, many
experiments have been quick
to
undermine
this
concept
as an illusion. Testing when
intention for a motor tasks arises
can only illuminate so much
about an individual’s subjective
experience. What would happen
to participants’ performing Libet
studies if they started to doubt
their experienced freedom? A team
in Berlin lead by Davide Rigoni
studied just that by hypothesizing

that if a participant’s free will is
denied, then they will become less
intentional in their involvement
in their preparation of voluntary
motor actions9. They observed
that the destruction of free will
affects brain correlates of volitional
processes even at a subconscious
level. When individuals were induced to stop believing in free
will, the RP was reduced before
they consciously decided to move.
These data suggest that the belief
in free will is related to early
motor preparation, not just motor
execution. Abstract beliefs such as
free will have a fundamental effect
on our intentional actions, and
manipulating these belief systems
affects the preconscious stages of
decision making. Self-efficacy and
perceived control are likely to be
important in the way we carry out
motor actions and view our own
agency, and the abstract belief in
free will is necessary for effective
planning and execution of tasks.
Unlike EEG, functional
magnetic
resonance
imaging
(fMRI) has high spatial resolution
and low temporal resolution. fMRI
can be used to study decision
making when participants are
asked to privately hold a decision

Chess on Wikimedia Commons
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in their mind during a delay period
before acting. JD Haynes lead
two fMRI experiments in which
participants were instructed to view
two numbers on a screen, decide
whether to add or subtract the two
numbers, hold this decision in their
mind during a delay period, then
select the intended result from
a screen of multiple numbers to
report which decision had been
made. Haynes hypothesized that if
our decisions could be predicted,
we must not be free in the way that
we think that we are—our casual
outcomes
are
predetermined
regardless of the experience of
choice. He found that activity in
medial and lateral prefrontal cortex
during the delay can be used to
accurately predict which decision
the agent had made. These regions
of the prefrontal cortex were seen
to be involved in freely chosen
intentions via localizable taskspecific representations. When
preparing to decide, the brain
encodes information specifically
related to that intention.
So our intentions and
goals are encoded by a network
of different brain regions, which
can be seen by changes in task
specific representations during
preparation and execution of
decision making10. Since the
spatial response patterns for each
task were specifically different
and not merely upregulated or
downregulated, intention must be
highly specific. But the idea that
human decisions are predictable
is not novel, and hardly conflicts
with philosophical assertions. To
bring us back to Kane, he would
suggest that there are only a few
instances within a lifetime that
define our identity. It is only in
cases where we have equal reason
to make two different choices that
we would act in a way that cannot
be reliably predicted5. Deciding
to add or subtract numbers on a
screen would not be one of these
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instances.
When the study was
repeated with a focus on the frontal
premotor cortex and a stronger
fMRI machine, Haynes reported
that when behavior is spontaneous,
unconscious generation of free
decisions can be observed through
predictive activity patterns that
increase in stability as the subject
becomes closer to making a
conscious decision. As the subject
increased in temporal proximity to
the decision, more decision related
information was carried. Once the
conscious decision was made,
these correlations dropped off11.
The increase in activity suggests
that there may be a threshold of
activity that must be crossed before
we can gain conscious awareness
of a decision.
In order to reconcile
evidence that shows that there
is no willed force involved until
after or during a movement is
performed with our perception
that we are free agents, many labs
have attempted to weaken the
results and implications of Libet
type experiments by altering the
design. If W can be shown to be
influenced systematically after a
willed movement has occurred,
then RPs may not be a very accurate
or reliable method for determining
and
recording
unconscious
decision making. When single
pulse
transcranial
magnetic
stimulation (TMS) is applied to the
supplementary motor area in Libet
design experiments during the time
point in which a decision is made,
W is influenced. Additionally, if the
experiment is changed so that the
button press created a delayed
tone, W is delayed respectively12.
Even in fMRI experiments, the
amount of attention placed on
intention and will can skew the
initial proposed results.
The manipulation of fMRI
and EEG experiments suggests
that we need more thorough

and accurate tests before we can
dismiss personal agency. Since
the results of these studies can be
altered, it is likely that our sense
of willing is not solely related to
intention of movement, and cannot
be time-locked to it. A unique
study conducted in 2009 by Hallett
and Ellenstein directly stimulated
parietal and premotor cortex regions
using direct electrical stimulation.
While direct stimulation techniques
result in very accurate and precise
data, these studies are uncommon
since they require electrodes to be
placed on the surface of the brain.
They are commonly performed on
small sample sizes of individuals
who are already receiving brain
surgery. In the experiment, seven
individuals with brain tumors were
stimulated at 57 various sites. When
the right inferior parietal region was
stimulated, patients experienced
a strong desire or intention to
move the contralateral foot, hand,
or arm. When the left inferior
parietal region was stimulated,
patients experienced a strong
desire to move their lips and speak.
Increasing the same stimulation
over either of these regions
resulted in the belief that that
motor tasks had been carried out,
even though no electromyographic
activity was detected. When the
premotor region was stimulated,
patients would not experience
and even denied moving despite
performing the corresponding
motor tasks3. These results show
that the conscious intention of a
movement and the results that we
predict from that intention are what
cause the subjective experience
of executing a motor task, not the
execution of the movement itself.
The majority of neurological
experiments
conducted
on
intention, decision making, and
free will point to the conclusion
that increased parietal activity
before movement execution is
what triggers conscious intention
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and motor awareness. The current
understanding of decision making
proposes that the sources of
our intentions are unknown and
unconscious; however, conscious
motor control is active in selecting
the chosen volitional process and
triggering the final motor result2.
While we may not consciously
initiate voluntary motor actions, our
will is active in selecting, controlling,
and therefore determining their
outcome. This is compatible with
John Martin Fischers’ definition of
individual agency as “view[ing] of
ourselves as agents who (help to)
select the path the world takes into
the future, among various paths it
genuinely could take.”5 The role of
consciousness and the will in motor
tasks, then, is to authorize their
implementation by accepting or
rejecting the unconscious intention
through executive control.
Even the thoroughly researched conception of executive
control can be challenged by
the limited capacity of the FPC.
Koechlin and Hyafil argue that the
FPC interacts with neighboring
prefrontal regions to enable high
level decision making; however, it
is restricted to processing simple
cognitive branching and can only
maintain a pending state of a single
task at one time. The prefrontal
executive system is required for the
materialization of higher cognitive
processes, and is flexible since
it is able to bear these mental
tasks even though the lateral
prefrontal cortex is constrained13.
As the uppermost point of the
executive system, the FPC interacts
with other prefrontal regions to
preserve the execution of long term
decisions, particularly when they
are threatened by more rewarding
immediate environmental factors14.
This evidence that the FPC is not
primarily involved with complex
decision making or high level
reasoning processes since it acts
at the end of an executive control

system primarily to endorse and
preserve mental plans exemplifies
the sheer complexity of human
reasoning.
Science is incredibly dynamic, and ideas thought to be factual
are constantly undermined. No
single experiment or pathway has
been able to explain why humans
perceive a unified conscious
experience. It is unreasonable, then,
to assume that one brain region
alone can both fully characterize
free will, and provide evidence
that it does not exist. Compatibilist
theories of science and free will
argue that even if the source of our
intentions is unknown, the laws of
nature and our past experiences still
contribute to the type of executive
control an individual will carry out9.
John Martin Fishcer summarizes
this view and reconciles the classic
definition of free will as:

My freedom now is my freedom
to add to the given past, holding
fixed the laws of nature. In terms
of our metaphor, my freedom is
the freedom to draw a line that
extends the line that connects
the actual past with the present
(holding fixed the natural laws).
The future may be a garden of
forking paths (in Borge’s lovely
phrase), but the forking paths all
branch off a single line.
We have reasons for vetoing or
endorsing actions, and those
reasons are our own in the sense that
they derive from our experience,
even if they are unconscious. If
nothing else, freedom exists as a
necessary phenomenon of human
nature and manifests through
endorsed action. Agent control
does not require the ability to do
otherwise, but rather the ability
to control our actions and the
outcomes of our desires.

“Decisions Must Be Made” by Simon
Matzinger on flickr

The philosophical conception of free will has been
rejected as too vague and
inappropriate for scientific and
psychiatric evaluations; however, it
is essential to our ethical views and
structures of morality, societal life,
and responsibility. Contextualizing
free will in terms of decision making
makes it more useful for analyzing
behavior and accountability, but
this scope is too narrow to include
important abstract values that
characterize our being. Philosophy
and empirical sciences seldom
coexist in intellectual discussion,
and the divergence of the two fields
has resulted in a language barrier.
It is the scientific understanding of
free will that is too limited, since it
involves a heavy presupposition that
control requires no predictability
and conscious intention. The ability
to predict which outcome an agent
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will choose is not inconsistent with
philosophy, since it is expected
that an individual would not
exercise the ability to do otherwise
a majority of the time. An adapted
understanding of free will that
satisfies both fields could propose
that insofar as an outcome can
succeed in what an agent was trying
for or wanting, the agent succeeds
in endorsing the outcome, and this
causal outcome is enough to grant
freedom.

Decisions on Max Pixel
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Even if human intention is
merely an unconscious result of
chains of necessitating causes that
can be traced to the past, we can
still have the freedom required for
free will. As long as the domain
of future reasoning contains the
possible outcomes under which
an individual’s behavior is a
function of their executive control,
an individual is capable of doing
whatever is a suitable function of
their will. Insofar as humans have

the capability to take ownership
for their actions by endorsing
or rejecting any given intention,
those actions are up to them, and
the origins of decisions are not
important as a threat to individual
agency. The active approval of a
decision is enough to mark that
decision as your own.
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